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 INTRODUCTION 
 America is frustrated with telemarketing.  To help individuals reclaim a 
measure of peace and privacy in their homes, the States and, later, the federal 
agencies had to step in.  On behalf of the fifty-one million individuals who have 
registered on the national do-not-call (“DNC”) list, Amici Curiae California, 
Colorado, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming (collectively “States”) submit 
this brief in support of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) (collectively “the federal agencies”) 
pursuant to F.R.A.P. 29(a). 
 When America demanded protection from these all too common and 
bothersome calls, the States’ regulatory response was restrained and thoughtfully 
crafted.  The States’ DNC laws do not impose a blanket, government-imposed 
restriction on commercial solicitations.  Rather, these laws depend on individual 
choice to activate their protection.  In addition, States have found that DNC laws 
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can be tailored to ensure that only those calls that are the most prevalent and 
unwelcome are eligible to be blocked.  The States’ experiences demonstrate that 
applying the law to unsolicited commercial calls will directly and materially 
advance residential privacy and do so in the most effective, yet least restrictive 
manner.  The States’ experiences show that exempting some noncommercial calls 
can be consistent with maintaining residential privacy.   
 When the federal agencies enacted their DNC rules there was a body of State 
experiences supporting distinctions between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.  With their individual DNC laws, the States have served as a proving 
ground for the development of innovative ways to protect residential privacy.  
These laws have been tested at the State level, and their provisions have proven to 
be principled and effective.  Thus, the States submit this Amici Curiae Brief to 
share their experiences and to support the federal agencies’ carefully tailored DNC 
rules. 
INTEREST OF AMICI 
 Consumer protection is a field traditionally regulated by the States as part of 
their historic police powers.  California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 
(1989).  Because under the federal agencies’ DNC rules state Attorneys General 
have been authorized by Congress to enforce the FTC and FCC telemarketing 
regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 6103; 47 U.S.C. § 227(f), the States’ interest is clear. 
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 The creation of the federal DNC list has also affected enforcement of State 
laws.  States that have maintained their own DNC lists can now supplement the 
enforcement of their state DNC laws with telephone numbers that are registered on 
the federal list.  See Appendix A, Summary of State DNC Laws, § I.  Other States 
provide state law protections to those who register on the federal list.  See id. § II.  
Thus, the implementation of the FTC and FCC DNC regulations is an important 
component in the States’ efforts to protect the public from intrusive telemarketing.  
BACKGROUND 
When the federal agencies enacted their DNC rules twenty-seven States 
already had enacted DNC laws.  See Telemarketing Sales Rules (“FTC Final 
Rule”), 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4630 n.592 and accompanying text (January 29, 2003) 
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310) (collecting state laws).  These state laws recognized 
the importance of residential privacy and concluded that telemarketing was an 
invasion of that privacy interest.  See Appendix A, § III.  Thus, by the time the 
federal agencies enacted their DNC rules, there was widespread recognition that 
residential privacy was an important interest and that unwanted telemarketing 
intruded upon this right.   
 Most of the State laws exempt noncommercial calls.  See Appendix A,  § IV.  
When the federal agencies enacted the national DNC registry, they likewise 
exempted noncommercial calls.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) and § 310.6(a) 
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(FTC DNC rules); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9) (FCC DNC rules).  The States’ 
experiences have shown that these reasonable exemptions, based on individuals’ 
expectations and preferences, do not undermine the effectiveness of the DNC laws. 
ARGUMENT 
I. There Is No Right To Direct Commercial Calls To An 
Objecting Listener In The Privacy Of The Listener’s Home. 
The Colorado District Court held that because the FTC’s DNC rules targeted 
commercial speech, they must be analyzed under the commercial speech test set 
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980).  Mainstream Mktg. v. FTC, No-03-N-184, slip op. at 17 – 18 (D. Colo. 
September 25, 2003).  In reaching this conclusion, however, the Colorado District 
Court did not consider the substantial right of unwilling listeners to exclude 
unwanted speech from their homes.  This substantial right must be measured 
against the total absence of any right of a commercial telemarketer to deliver an 
unwanted message into the home.  See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 
728 (1970).  See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Hill v. Colorado, 530 
U.S. 703 (2000).  Because there is no First Amendment right to force unwanted 
commercial calls into the home, an analysis under Central Hudson is unnecessary. 
In Hill, the Supreme Court recognized that the right of an unwilling listener 
to avoid unwanted speech is one of our most established and inviolate rights:  “It is 
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an aspect of the broader ‘right to be let alone’ that one of our wisest Justices 
characterized as ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.’”  Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 – 717 (quoting Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis J., dissenting)).  At issue in Hill was a Colorado statute 
that prohibited sidewalk counselors from breaching an 8-foot buffer around 
individuals entering health clinics.  This law pitted the right of an unwilling 
listener “to be let alone” against the right of another to communicate.  Id. at 718.  
After carefully balancing these interests, the Court upheld the right of the unwilling 
listener.  In reaching this conclusion the Court relied heavily on Rowan and Frisby, 
in which the Court held that the “right to avoid unwelcome speech has special 
force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings.”  Id. at 717.  
In Rowan, the Court entertained a challenge to a federal statute that allowed 
residents to block future mailings to their home if they notified the Postmaster that 
they received advertisements for “matter which the addressee in his sole discretion 
believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.”  Rowan, 397 U.S. at 
729 – 730.  The Court explained that “Congress has erected a wall—or more 
accurately permits a citizen to erect a wall—that no advertiser may penetrate 
without his acquiescence.”  Id. at 738. 
The Rowan Court gave great weight to the recipients’ right to decide what 
speech to allow into their homes.  Allowing the resident to make this choice struck 
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an eminently reasonable balance, the Court stressed, because it did not operate to 
substitute the government’s judgment for that of the resident.  See id. at 734 and 
737 – 738.  The Court observed that “the right of every person ‘to be let alone’ 
must be placed on the scales with the right of others to communicate . . .”  Id. at 
736.  After weighing these rights the Court concluded that “a mailer’s right to 
communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee.”  Id. at 736 – 
737. 
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The possibility that valuable communication might be restricted prompted 
no equivocation by the Court in Rowan: 
We therefore categorically reject the argument that a 
vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to 
send unwanted material into the home of another.  If this 
prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid 
ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even 
‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient. 
Id. at 738 (citation omitted).   
In Frisby, the Court again emphasized that “[t]here simply is no right to 
force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.”  Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.  See 
also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“[I]n the privacy of the 
home . . . the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder.”). 
Thus, Rowan and Frisby recognize a strong right of an unwilling listener to 
exclude unwanted speech from his or her home.  Hill took this right a step further 
and upheld speech restrictions where core speech was directed to an unwilling 
listener in a public setting.   
Taken together the Rowan-Frisby-Hill holdings create a balancing test 
whenever the right of an unwilling listener to exclude unwanted speech is pitted 
against the rights of a speaker.  In this balancing test, the right of the unwilling 
listener is given special weight when the message is directed into the unwilling 
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listener’s home.  Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736 – 737; Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.  This 
right is stronger yet when the resident—not the government—makes the decision 
that the communication may not enter the home, as is the case here.  Rowan, 397 
U.S. at 734 and 737 – 738.  Compare Bolger v. Young’s Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 71 – 72 (1983) (invalidating a federal law that banned the mailing of 
unsolicited contraceptive advertising and provided no mechanism for the resident 
to exercise choice as to whether to accept or reject the unsolicited advertisement).   
As in Rowan, the federal DNC rules allow individuals—not the 
government—to decide whether commercial solicitations may cross their homes’ 
thresholds.  Moreover, the DNC rules apply to individuals in the privacy of their 
homes. 1  Here, the unwilling listener is more accurately described as an objecting 
listener.  Mainstream seeks to override the established rights of an objecting 
listener by interjecting a commercial solicitation into the privacy and serenity of 
                                          
1 In addition to protecting privacy in the home, the regulations also permit 
registration of wireless telephone numbers on the DNC registry, but that is not a 
significant new restriction on telemarketers.  It was already illegal to place such 
calls using the automatic dialing systems commonly used by telemarketers.  47 
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).  The decision to allow registration of wireless telephone 
numbers was made in recognition of the fact that many wireless subscribers pay for 
incoming calls.  FTC Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4632 – 4633 n.634 and 
accompanying text; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991 (“FCC Final Rule”), 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,165 at ¶ 116 
(July 25, 2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200). 
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his or her home.  As in Rowan, the right of the objecting listener to stop this 
solicitation must prevail. 
The Colorado District Court discounted the individual choice provided for 
under the federal DNC rules because it felt that the noncommercial speech 
exemptions unduly influenced the individual’s choice.  Mainstream Mktg., No. 03-
N-184, slip op. at 18.  This conclusion is contrary to the evidence and the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150 (2002).   
In Watchtower, the Supreme Court indicated that it is permissible to draw a 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech when regulating 
solicitations directed into the privacy of the home.  Though the Court held that the 
challenged ordinance swept too broadly because it regulated religious speech, the 
Court noted, albeit in dicta, that had the ordinance applied only to commercial 
solicitations, it may have been narrowly tailored to advance residential privacy.  Id. 
Also, because noncommercial calls are not as prevalent or bothersome to 
individuals as unsolicited commercial calls, there is a valid basis for distinguishing 
between commercial and noncommercial speech.  See § II(B)(2)(a), infra, at 19 – 
20.  When a valid basis exists to distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial speech, (such as when seeking to protect residential privacy) the 
regulatory system must be upheld.  Id. 
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 The federal DNC rules give meaning to the strong right of objecting listeners 
to exclude unwanted commercial solicitations from their homes.  When balanced 
against the right of the commercial solicitor to call into the home, the right of the 
objecting listener must prevail.  Thus, under Rowan-Frisby-Hill, the federal DNC 
rules need not be analyzed under Central Hudson.  
II. The Federal DNC Rules Are Valid Under Central Hudson. 
Even if the Court determines that Central Hudson provides the appropriate 
analytical framework for deciding the constitutionality of the federal DNC rules, 
the rules pass constitutional muster, and the decision below must be reversed. 
Under Central Hudson, the government may regulate truthful, non-deceptive 
commercial speech if “(1) [the government] has a substantial state interest in 
regulating the speech, (2) the regulation directly and materially advances that 
interest, and (3) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the 
interest.”  Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. for the State of N.M., 106 F.3d 
929, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997) (citing Central Hudson). 
A. There Is A Substantial Interest In Protecting 
Residential Privacy From Unwanted 
Commercial Sales Calls.  
In its October 7, 2003, order granting the FTC’s motion for a stay pending 
appeal, this Court has already undertaken a thorough analysis of why the federal 
DNC rules pass the Central Hudson test.  The States agree with that analysis, and it 
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would serve no purpose to repeat it here.  Instead, the States raise a few discrete 
points to supplement those already considered by the Court. 
As discussed above, it is well established that the government has a 
substantial interest in protecting residential privacy.  Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485; 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).   
The governmental interest here, an interest in allowing people to make their 
own choices about whether they wish to accept unsolicited commercial 
telemarketing calls, is focused and specific to the individuals who seek to invoke 
their well-established right as objecting listeners to exclude unwanted solicitations 
from the home.  The DNC regulations protect only those people affirmatively 
seeking protection; the regulations burden only that speech which is directed at 
unwilling listeners.  There can be no question that this governmental interest is 
substantial. 
The already ample record concerning the government’s substantial interest 
in this regard is bolstered by the experiences of the States in adopting their own 
DNC laws.  Many of the States’ DNC laws refer to this interest.  See Appendix A, 
§ III.  The FTC was made aware of this public interest early in its rulemaking 
process, at a forum organized to discuss the possibility of a national DNC list.  An 
FTC representative asked why more and more States were enacting DNC laws.  A 
representative from the Kentucky Attorney General’s Office explained that:   
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I cannot tell you how intense, how strong an issue this is 
to the people.  We get calls by the hundreds, the 
legislators report to us it is far and above the biggest 
issue which they get any calls on, that people are saying 
that they absolutely want some means of controlling the 
calls that come into their home. 
Transcript of January 11, 2000 Proceeding at 137 (statement of Kentucky Assistant 
Attorney General Wanda Delaplane ) (part of the FTC’s Internet-based rulemaking 
record at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/tsrrulemaking/).  Also, as a 
representative from the National Association of Attorneys General  explained, 
States that enacted DNC laws found the public response to be immediate and 
overwhelming; more than one state agency had its own telephone system 
overwhelmed by calls from individuals eager to sign up.  Id. at 89.  This public 
outcry for protection from unwanted telemarketing calls was the basis for 
Congressional and State legislative action. 
Finally, although Mainstream has consistently relied on US West, Inc. v. 
FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) to argue that there is not a substantial interest 
in protecting residential privacy, US West does not apply here.   
In US West, this Court agreed that privacy “may rise to the level of a 
substantial state interest.”  Id. at 1234.  At issue in that case was an FCC regulation 
that sought to protect consumer calling records from being divulged by the 
telephone company.  Here, the federal DNC rules are trying to protect the choice of 
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an objecting listener to exclude unwanted solicitations from intruding upon the 
serenity of the home—a clearly established right.   
The US West Court distinguished the privacy interest before it from those 
cases that have recognized a state’s interest in protecting against unwanted 
intrusions caused by solicitations.  Id. at 1235.  The US West Court specifically 
noted that it was not dealing with the privacy interest that protects against a 
telemarketing intrusion.  Id. at 1236 n.8.  Rather, it indicated that the privacy 
interest in consumer calling records was a new interest.  See id. at 1235.  The Court 
specifically distinguished this emerging privacy interest from the privacy interest 
that protects against the unwanted intrusion into an individual’s home caused by 
solicitations.  Id.  Because US West was dealing with a different interest it is 
inapplicable. 
The right to residential privacy, free from unwanted solicitations, is at least a 
substantial interest, if not a compelling interest under well established First 
Amendment precedent.  Accordingly, the rules meet the first part of the Central 
Hudson test.  
B. The Rules Materially And Directly Advance 
The Government’s Interests. 
Mainstream argues, essentially, that the rules fail to materially advance the 
government’s stated interest, because they would not block all (or nearly all) forms 
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of telephone solicitation.  This argument is not only contrary to the evidence, but 
assumes a legal standard that is far more stringent than Central Hudson and its 
progeny.    
1. The Overall Regulatory System Is Likely 
To Substantially Reduce Unwanted 
Telemarketing Calls. 
Mainstream argues that the federal DNC rules cannot be constitutional 
unless all telephone solicitation calls are blocked.  Central Hudson does not require 
this all-or-nothing approach.  So long as the DNC rules achieve a reasonable fit 
between “the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,” 
the Court will “leave it to the governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner 
of regulation may best be employed.” Bd. Of Trustees of St. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).   
As this Court recognized in its October 7 order, these two sets of regulations, 
and their likely effect, should not be considered in isolation.  This case 
demonstrates the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s observation “that the 
Government [need not] make progress on every front before it can make progress 
on any front.”  United States v. Edge Broadcasting Company, 509 U.S. 418, 434 
(1993).  Here, the District Court’s focus on the FTC front ignored the fact that this 
battle has been waged on many fronts.  The problem of intrusive, unwanted 
telemarketing calls is ubiquitous, and the States and the federal government have 
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addressed it in a variety of ways.  Each step along the way has improved 
individuals’ ability to protect themselves from unwanted telemarketing calls.  As 
would be expected (indeed, encouraged) in our federal system, the States have 
tried different approaches, serving as laboratories for the development of 
governmental solutions to a problem that is of widespread concern.  While none of 
these varied approaches has fully and permanently solved the problem—no law 
ever does—they have each materially advanced the government’s interest in 
addressing it.  Under the District Court’s reasoning, none of these laws would have 
been allowed to take effect, because each would have been struck down as less 
than a complete solution. 
The likely effect of the FTC and FCC regulations must be examined in a 
context that includes the efforts of both agencies as well as those of the States.  
With regard to the federal agencies, each has the authority to enforce its own rules; 
each agency will bring its own particular strengths to those efforts, so federal 
enforcement will benefit from the FTC’s experience in consumer protection and 
the FCC’s expertise in the use of communications technologies.  In addition, the 
States have statutory authority to prosecute violations of both agencies’ 
regulations.  15 U.S.C. § 6103 (FTC); 47 U.S.C. § 227(f) (FCC).  State prosecutors 
are well positioned to recognize and respond to patterns of violations that affect 
particular regions of the country and their own States’ citizens.  State and federal 
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authorities will also be able to join resources when that is appropriate, and to 
coordinate their work in order to maximize the overall effectiveness of the 
regulations. 
In particular, the effectiveness of the FTC’s regulations cannot be evaluated 
without considering the effect of the FCC’s regulations, because the FCC 
regulations reach businesses (such as common carriers and banks) and intrastate 
calls that are not within the FTC’s jurisdiction.  Viewed in that light, the District 
Court’s assumption that the FTC’s regulations would block 40% to 60% of all 
unwanted telephone solicitations suggests that the combined regulations would 
reach a substantial majority of all telephone solicitation calls, and an even higher 
percentage of the commercial telemarketing calls found by Congress to be most 
intrusive.  See H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.  at *16 (1991). 
Furthermore, the experiences of the States with DNC lists suggest that 
Mainstream underestimates the extent to which telemarketing calls will be reduced.  
For example, Indiana has enacted a DNC law that exempts certain categories of 
charitable and commercial solicitation calls.  Despite these exclusions, independent 
research showed that individuals who signed up on the Indiana DNC list saw the 
number of solicitation calls (including exempt calls) decline by more than 80%.  
See Martin & Assoc. v. Carter, Cause No. 82C01- 
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0201-PL-38, slip op. at 30 – 31 (Vanderburgh Cir. Ct., July 5, 2002) (copy  
attached as Appendix B).2   
Thus, by covering a substantial number of the calls that are placed to the 
home, the rules materially and directly protect residential privacy.  This same logic 
persuaded the Eight Circuit to uphold the TCPA’s ban on fax advertising, which 
applied only to commercial entities but exempted noncommercial faxes.  Missouri 
v. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d 649, 658 (8th Cir. 2003).  The federal DNC rules 
take a similar approach.  They give the individual an option to  
                                          
2 The Indiana trial court’s finding and the legislative history of the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, discussed, infra, at 
19 – 20, may be received by the Court in support of the DNC rules, even if the 
FTC did not rely on them in its statement of basis and purpose for its DNC rules.  
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (A 
valid justification for a speech restriction “may not be ignored merely because it is 
unclear to what extent the purpose motivated the . . . legislature.”).  See also 
Essence, Inc. v. Federal Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1284 – 1285 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(relying on post-enactment evidence to justify a speech restriction); Anderson v. 
Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 461 n.5 (2nd Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 U.S. 1482 
(2003).   In fact, the Court can rely on a wide variety of sources to justify a speech 
restriction.  See Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (plurality 
opinion) (relying on a single study and common sense); id. at 451 – 452 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (same); Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 51 – 52 (1986) 
(relying on studies and anecdotes from other locales); Florida Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (permissible to rely solely on history, consensus and 
simple common sense); Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 654 
(8th Cir. 2003) (relying on the legislative history of a predecessor bill). 
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eliminate those telemarketing calls that account for a substantial number of the  
calls that disrupt the serenity and privacy of the home.   
2. The Validity Of The Regulations Is Not 
Defeated By The Decision To Recognize 
Differences Between Commercial And 
Charitable Solicitations. 
a. The Distinction Is Based On 
Differences Pertaining To The Goal 
Of Reducing Unwanted 
Telemarketing Calls. 
 This Court has recognized and analyzed the reasons why the FTC properly 
concluded that commercial and charitable solicitations need not be subject to 
identical regulations.  The record shows that individuals consider commercial calls 
to be more intrusive than charitable solicitations.  In a regulatory system intended 
to allow individuals to make their own choices about which calls to receive, it 
would be counterproductive to ignore that distinction; it is a distinction that is 
directly related to the purpose of the regulations. 
 There is empirical evidence showing that people find charitable solicitations 
to be less intrusive than sales calls.  During Congressional hearings on the TCPA, 
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce studied the nature of the 
telemarketing intrusion.  See H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at *13 – *17.  It found that 
individuals generally have two objections to telemarketing.  Id. at *14.  The first 
pertains to the volume of unwanted calls and the second relates to whether the call 
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is expected.  Id.  Based on the evidence that it received, the House Committee 
found that individuals are more accepting of noncommercial calls because they are 
more expected.  Id. at *16.  This evidence that individuals expect these calls 
supports the decision by the FTC and FCC to exempt noncommercial calls.  
American Blast Fax again supports the distinction drawn between commercial and 
noncommercial solicitations on this basis.  American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 656 
(citing the TCPA’s legislative history, H.R. Rep. 102-317, at *16). 
These considerations show why the DNC regulations are unlike the 
ordinance invalidated in Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks, 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
That ordinance distinguished between commercial and noncommercial speech 
solely because of the view that commercial speech had less value under the 
Constitution, rather than for any reason related to the aesthetic interests behind the 
ordinance.  Individuals’ receptiveness to these exempt calls serves to distinguish 
this case from the regulation at issue in Discovery Networks.  Here, there is ample 
evidence that excluding noncommercial speech is consistent with the goal of 
protecting residential privacy. 
Also, the Cincinnati ordinance directly prohibited the dissemination of 
speech (the commercial or noncommercial nature of which was in question) via 
newsracks that were owned by the speakers (the two companies) and located on 
public property (the city sidewalks).  In contrast, the government enforces the 
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registry provisions at issue here only if a telephone subscriber first chooses to 
invoke them; the registry provisions apply to speech that is clearly commercial in 
nature, in that the prohibition on calls to people who have signed on to the registry 
applies only to solicitations that seek to persuade consumers to buy or invest in 
something; and the instrumentality for dissemination of the telemarketer’s 
commercial speech – the consumer’s telephone – does not belong to the speaker 
and generally is located on private property. 
b. The Distinction Between 
Commercial And Charitable Calls 
Reflects The Government’s Effort 
To Balance Competing Interests 
 Any measure of the effectiveness of the regulations must be based on more 
than just the percentage of telemarketing calls that will be blocked.  If the 
agencies’ sole interest had been to block all telemarketing calls, they could have 
achieved that goal with a straightforward, all-encompassing ban on telemarketing.  
It is evident from the regulatory record and rationale that both agencies sought to 
achieve a balance of competing legitimate interests.   
In United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993) the Supreme 
Court made it clear that the effectiveness of an effort at balancing cannot be 
measured against absolutist goals.  In Edge, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a federal statute that generally prohibited the broadcast of 
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lottery advertisements.  An exception allowed broadcasting of information 
concerning state-sponsored lotteries, but only by broadcasters located within States 
that sponsored lotteries. 
The statute was challenged by a broadcaster who operated in North Carolina 
(a non-lottery State), but primarily broadcasted to listeners across the State line in 
Virginia (a lottery State).  Measured against a goal of preventing lottery 
promotions from reaching listeners in non-lottery States, the statute was clearly 
overinclusive, because it also blocked some lottery promotions from listeners in 
neighboring lottery States.  It was also underinclusive, because listeners in non-
lottery States would hear promotions broadcast from lottery States.  Finding the 
statute constitutional, the Court recognized that the purpose of the legislation was 
not to eliminate all lottery promotions, but to balance the competing interests of 
lottery states and non-lottery States.  Id. at 433 – 434.   
Here, it is evident that the FTC and FCC sought to do something other than 
eliminate all telemarketing calls.  Rather, their obvious goal was to achieve a 
balance, reducing telephone solicitation calls to those who prefer not to receive 
them, preserving a means by which individuals could choose something other than 
all-or-nothing exclusion of such calls, allowing commercial solicitors to generate 
income by calling those who do not object, and allowing charitable solicitors to 
seek donations and advocate issues while respecting individuals’ wishes.  The 
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rulemaking records and the federal legislative record show that there was an ample 
basis for the agencies to conclude that their chosen approach would have a 
substantial impact on unwanted telemarketing calls without undue effect on the 
other interests at stake. 
By giving individuals the right to block the most prevalent and unwanted 
calls, the federal DNC rules directly and materially advance residential privacy.  
Thus, the federal DNC rules satisfy the second part of the Central Hudson test. 
C. The Federal DNC Rules Are Not More 
Extensive Than Necessary to Achieve the 
Governmental Interest.  
 The federal agencies do not have to prove that the rules are the least 
restrictive alternative, or that there are no conceivable alternatives to the DNC 
rules.  Fox, 492 U.S. at 478.  The law instead requires that the “regulation not 
burden more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate 
interest.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).   
Since Fox, Courts have held that individual-initiated restrictions on 
commercial speech satisfy the tailoring requirement of the Central Hudson test.  
See U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (permitting individual 
homeowners to block unwanted cable channels is a less restrictive alternative than 
banning sexually explicit channels); Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462 (2nd 
Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 1482 (2003) (giving individuals the choice 
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whether to block speech from coming into their homes is no more extensive than 
necessary because “it is precisely co-extensive with those who are experiencing the 
particular harm that it is designed to alleviate”); South/Southwest Assoc. of 
Realtors v. Village of Evergreen Park, 109 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(municipal ordinance prohibiting commercial solicitation to a homeowner who has 
given a non-solicitation notice to the city is narrowly tailored because “it leaves 
control in the hands of its residents and bars communication only to the extent that 
the resident requests.”). 
 The DNC regulations are tailored to exclude only those calls that individuals 
want excluded.  Individuals who want to block calls from all or most telemarketers 
can do so through the national registry.  Individuals who register may continue to 
receive calls from businesses with whom they have an established business 
relationship, but individuals can block those calls as well by asking those 
businesses to cease calling.  To the extent individuals are willing to accept calls 
from some but not all telemarketers, they may choose to register their telephone 
numbers, then provide authorization to those companies whose calls they are 
willing to accept.  Alternatively, individuals can bypass the registry, and choose to 
rely on company-specific lists.  Because of this flexibility, there is no reason why a 
telemarketer will be blocked from calling a willing listener.   
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 In the Colorado District Court, Mainstream alleged that the federal DNC 
rules go too far because the federal agencies did not consider call blocking options 
available through call blocking services, electronic gimmicks and industry self-
regulation as less restrictive alternatives.  These alternatives are either costly or 
ineffective.  In addition, the FTC and FCC had an ample basis, given their prior 
experience, for concluding that regulations based only on a company-specific list 
were “seriously inadequate” in protecting residential privacy.  See FTC Final 
Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4631; FCC Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44147. 
Moreover, the regulations include a “safe harbor,” so that telemarketers who 
are doing what is necessary to comply with the law will not be held strictly liable 
for an inadvertent call to a telephone number on the registry.  16 C.F.R. 
§ 310.4(b)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). 
Also, Mainstream’s suggested alternatives are not viable to protect 
residential privacy.  A less restrictive alternative must be at least as effective as the 
rules in advancing this important interest.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 
(1997).  Here the federal DNC rules are tailored to just those individuals who seek 
its protection.  They cost individuals nothing and are effective in preventing the 
bulk of the unwanted calls from ringing into the home in the first instance.  The 
alternatives are costly and many times do not prevent the ringing of the phone in 
the first instance. 
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Finally, all of Mainstream’s suggested alternatives assume that the States 
and federal agencies should not play a role in regulating practices that disturb 
residential privacy.  Protecting the well-being and tranquility of the home, 
however, are matters squarely within the States’ and federal agencies’ police 
powers.  The DNC rules and state laws are a valid exercise of this power, 
notwithstanding the existence of self-help devices, all of which are not as effective 
as the DNC rules and State laws. 
III. The Federal DNC Rules Are Not Subject To Strict Scrutiny. 
In the Colorado District Court, Mainstream claimed that the federal DNC 
rules amount to a content-based restriction because they target commercial 
solicitations while exempting noncommercial solicitations.  The mere fact that a 
statute regulates commercial speech does not mean that the statute is a content-
based restriction.  This theory would subject all commercial speech regulations to 
heightened scrutiny, which has been consistently rejected.  See Thompson v. 
Western States Med. Center, 535 U.S. 357, 367 – 368 (2002); Anderson, 294 F.3d 
at 460 (rejecting the argument that a commercial speech restriction creates a 
content specific regulation).  This Court has previously held that even if a 
regulation can be viewed as content-based, if it concerns commercial speech it is 
still subject to analysis under the Central Hudson standard.  Lanphere & Urbaniak 
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v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1044 (1994).  
Therefore, strict scrutiny does not apply here. 
CONCLUSION 
 The States have had considerable experience in crafting and enforcing their 
DNC laws.  This experience supports the fact that the right of an objecting listener 
to exclude unwanted solicitations from intruding upon his or her residential privacy 
is an established and inviolate right.  Thus, a commercial telemarketer must stop its 
message at the threshold of the home of an unwilling listener.   
 The States’ experiences also support the federal agencies’ conclusion that 
their regulations will protect residential privacy, and are no more restrictive than 
necessary.  The federal DNC rules are consistent with residential privacy and the 
First Amendment.  The States therefore support reversal of the Colorado District 
Court’s decision in Mainstream Mktg. and upholding the FCC’s rules. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SUMMARY OF STATE DO-NOT-CALL LAWS 
 
I.  States with DNC registries under their state laws and which can 
incorporate the federal DNC registry: 
 
Colorado:    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-905(3)(c) 
Louisiana:  La. Rev. Stat. § 45:844.13(A) and (D) 
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159C 
Mississippi:  Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-717 
Missouri:  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.1101.1(3) 
Tennessee:  Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-4-405(c) 
 
II. States that rely on the federal DNC registry: 
 
Alabama:  Ala. Code § 8-19A-3 
Arizona:    Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1282(A) 
Arkansas:  Ark. Code. Ann. § 4-99-405(3) 
California: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17592(a)(2), as amended 2003 
Cal. Stat. Ch. 779 
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-288a 
Georgia:  Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-27(d)(4) 
Illinois:  815 ILCS 402/20(a) 
Michigan:  Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.111a 
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-22(C)  
New York:  N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-z(2)(b) 
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-101(3) and 75-102(a) 
Pennsylvania: 73 P.S. § 2242 
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 49-31-103 
Vermont:  Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 9, § 2464a 
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III. State DNC laws that recognize telemarketing as an invasion of 
residential privacy: 
 
Alaska:  Alaska Stat. 45.50.475 
Arkansas:  Ark. Code Ann. § 4-99-402(a) 
Colorado:  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-902(1)(b) 
California: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17590, as amended 2003 Cal. 
Stat. Ch. 779 
Georgia:  Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-27(a)(4) – (7) 
Mississippi:  Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-703  
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-100(2) and (3) 
Oregon:  Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.563, § 646.569 
Tennessee:  1999 Tenn. Pub. Acts, 478, Preamble, ¶ 5 
Vermont:  Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 9, § 2464a 
 
IV. States with exemptions for noncommercial calls: 
 
Alabama:  Ala. Code § 8-19A-(2) 
Arkansas:  Ark. Code Ann. § 4-99-406(5) 
California: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17592(e)(7), as amended 2003 
Cal. Stat. Ch. 779 
Colorado:  Colo. Rev. Stat § 6-1-903(10)(b) 
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-288(a)(6)(B) 
Georgia:  Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-27(b)(3)(C) 
Illinois:  815 ILCS 402/5(e)(4) 
Indiana: Ind. Code Ann § 24.4.7-1-1 (exempting some calls made 
by or on behalf of charitable organizations, licensed real 
estate agents, licensed insurance agents and newspapers) 
Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:844.12(4)(d) 
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159C, Sec. 1 
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.111e(a) 
Minnesota:  Minn. Stat. § 325E.311 § 6(3) 
Mississippi:  Miss. Code Ann. §§ 77-3-709(b) and (c) 
Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.1095(3)(c) 
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-22(C)(1) and (D)(4) 
New York: N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-z(1)(g) 
North Carolina: N.C. Stat. § 75-103(a)(3)  
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. Title 15, § 775B.2(1) 
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Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.561(a) and (b); 
§ 646.567(5)(b) and (c) 
Pennsylvania: 73 P.S. § 2242 
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-4-401(6)(B)(ii) 
Texas: Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 44.003(b)(2) 
Virginia: Va. Code § 59.1-510 
 
 
